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METROPOLITAN REGIONALISM: LEGAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
William Millert
The legal requirements of effective metropolitan government are
simply stated to provide the means of formation of common policy for
common problems, to enable the adoption of over-all plans to meet the
total needs of the metropolitan area and to organize the resources of
the entire area to implement those policies and plans. It is the purpose
of this paper to explore the more significant legal problems which are
suggested by these objectives.
The one hundred seventy-four metropolitan "agglomerations," as
they have been called, are found in forty-two states, meaning at least that
many potentially different systems of jurisprudence. Furthermore, the
problem of the metropolis for conventional governmental units is ap-
preciated more when it is seen that the area covered frequently is not
only larger than a city, but may be inter-county. Thirty metropolitan
areas are now inter-county. They are not within the jurisdiction of any
of the traditional units of state government. Another twenty-four
metropolitan units are not even within the territory of one state. Ef-
fective government in these areas requires cooperation between a mini-
mum of two state governments, and at times, the consent of Congress.
An additional twenty-nine metropolitan areas border state lines.
Several are international.' Nevertheless, they all have the common
ancestor-the outward growth from a central city without comparable
change in the political boundaries of the city. With reference to this
growth, it has been said that:
.. . Suburbanization, in essence, is a manifestation that
the city-as-a-community is expanding more rapidly than the
city-as-a-political entity. The fact is that our legal and political
precepts have not kept pace with the changes in urban living.
In too many areas the problems have become so
acute as to threaten major disruption of services. Particularly
has this been true in:
t Professor of Law, New York University; Consultant for legal, administra-
tive and financial studies to the New Jersey-New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit
Survey. B.S., 1933; J.D., 1935; J.S.D., 1938, New York University.
1. These data may be found in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES
AND THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM 3-17 (1956).
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(1) Organizing public transportation and the movement
of people
(2) Developing adequate school facilities
(3) Policing, notably in fighting organized crime
(4) Providing public utilities, especially water and
sewerage facilities
And were the horrible eventuality of war to become a reality, a
fifth and most urgent problem-that of civilian defense-would
quickly be added to this list." 2
The question remains-is it law or politics that "lag"?
UNITS OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
The realization that metropolitan problems were integrated pro-
duced a realization that they could not be met by non-integrated govern-
mental units acting independently. Various devices have been utilized
to create adequate metropolitan government. Several of these involve
considerable re-arrangement of boundary lines, the displacement of
office holders and the reconciliation of state constitutional limitations
which reflect needs of the past. For these reasons they are increasingly
difficult to implement. Annexation, for example, results in the com-
plete incorporation of a contiguous area into the central city. Used
substantially in the last century, the device now has potentiality only
for the integration of fringe areas of low population density which are
unincorporated-and has been very actively used for this purpose over
the past ten years. City-county consolidation affects the boundary
line of the city and may cause the displacement of office holders in
each unit. Once created, these governments have difficulty coping with
practical metropolitan problems, which frequently extend beyond
county borders. City-county separation cuts the jurisdiction of the
county short of the richest sources of revenue. It is now rarely used
except in Virginia. Federation is an ambitious plan which would
make the municipal governments subordinate "legislative" units in an
area-wide government. It would provide one of the most complete
answers to the need for over-all metropolitan control as well as for local
control over distinctively municipal problems. The device has never
been utilized in the United States. The federation of the Toronto,
Canada area in 1953 represents the only recent example on this con-
tinent.
2. MERmEm, THE FEDERiAL GOVERNMENT AND METROPOLITAN AREAs 2 (address
by the Assistant Director, United States Bureau of the Budget before Regional
Plan Association, Oct. 22, 1956).
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Other devices require no boundary changes and only slight displace-
ment of office holders. The legal problems, furthermore, are not as
difficult for this group as for those mentioned above. Frequently, these
devices center around the management of a single function such as
transportation, bridge operation or sewerage. A common method
is the creation by mutual agreement of a joint authority. Each munic-
ipality usually must give its consent to unforeseen action. The transfer
of functions to already existing governmental units, as from city to
county, is a closely related device. Another method which is used to
a great extent for a limited number of functions, frequently as a last
resort, is the creation of special metropolitan districts.
MAY A LEGISLATURE CREATE A "METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT"?
If by the creation of a metropolitan government we mean the
adaptation of the area of the political subdivision to the area of central
influence, it is almost ancient learning that a legislature has common-
law power to go all the way-to wipe out all old boundaries and create
new. The Pittsburgh annexation proves the point. There Allegheny
County sought to prevent annexation on the ground that Pittsburgh
was greatly in debt and lacked the improvements that Allegheny had
already installed; that as a consequence of annexation the tax burden
in Allegheny would be considerably heavier, without any corresponding
benefit to the Allegheny taxpayer. It was held that the annexation
was valid under state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court
stated the rule broadly:
"Neither their charter, nor any law conferring governmental
powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental
purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property,
or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract
with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
The state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all
such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold
it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the
territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another munic-
ipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this
may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these
respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, confirming
its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained
by any provision of the Constitution of the United States." '
3. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) ; accord, Toney v. Macon,
119 Ga. 83, 46 S.E. 80 (1903), appeal dismissed, 195 U.S. 625 (1904).
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There is no doubt that the legislature, in the absence of constitu-
tional restriction, may divide counties and towns at its pleasure, and
apportion the common property and the common burdens in such
manner as may seem reasonable and equitable to the legislature.' The
power to transfer the property of a municipal corporation is necessarily
incident to the power to divide its territory and to create new
corporations.5
While the fundamental law is thus well settled, the successful efforts
at metropolitan adaptation have been few and far between; a few city-
county consolidations such as Denver and Los Angeles, the nineteenth-
century creations of greater New York City, and more recently Rich-
mond I and Baton Rouge 7 annexations and consolidations are among
the few examples.
The reasons for this slow progress are as much practical or political
as they may be legal. In a few states, however, an unhappy array
of older cases may impose special constitutional barriers to the creation
of any general purpose unit of metropolitan government which does
not follow the conventional pattern of county, township, village or city.
A line of cases in New York illustrate this problem. In the' earliest,
decided in 1857, the legislature created a metropolitan police district
comprising four counties and vested the general police power of the
district in a special board of police commissioners. The conventional
units of government within the district determined the number of
police necessary in their respective areas and paid a proportionate share
of the operational cost. It was held that this type of district did not
4. Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875); Johnson v. San
Diego, 109 Cal. 468, 42 Pac. 249 (1895); Township of Bloomfield v. Borough of
Glen Ridge, 54 N.J. Eq. 276, 33 Ad. 925 (Ch. 1896) ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier,
29 Vt. 12 (1856). For state limitations upon power of the legislature to change
boundaries of municipality subject to outstanding obligations, see Board of Edu-
cation v. Board of Education, 245 Mich. 411, 222 N.W. 763 (1929); cf. Kies v.
Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905). See also Loving County v. Reeves County, 126
S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). In the face of constitutional provisions against
incurring obligations without a vote of the electors an independent school district
to which another district is annexed does not become liable for the bonded in-
debtedness of the annexed district. The property of the annexed district remains
liable for the debts of its original district and becomes liable after annexation for
the obligations of the enlarged district. Missouri-K.T.R.R. v. Excise Bd., 181 Okl.
229, 73 P.2d 173 (1937).
5. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Clinton v. Cedar Rapids &
Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868); Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 515
(1857); Bristol v. New Charter, 3 N.H. 524 (1826); Darlington v. City of New
York, 31 N.Y. 163, 195 (1865). The power to divide a governmental area is in
its nature purely legislative. City of Olney v. Harvey, 50 Ill. 453 (1869);
Shelby County Judge v. Shelby R.R., 5 Bush (Ky.) 225, 228 (1868); Powers v.
Commissioners, 8 Ohio St 285, 290 (1858).
6. Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941).
7. State ex rel. Kemp v. Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So. 2d 477 (1949) ; Kean,
Consolldation That Works, 45 NAT'L MuNic. REv. 478 (1956).
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bypass the political subdivisions recognized by the constitution and
accordingly its constitutionality was upheld.' Subsequently, about a
decade later, the authority of the legislature to create a regional board
of health embracing several counties was also upheld.9 In the third
case in this line, however, the court invalidated a statute creating a
"territory of Sylvan Beach" with local police power, on the ground that
the provisions of the state constitution enumerating the four standard
classifications of local government implicitly excluded legislative power
to create any other division of local government for general purposes."0
It may be significant that the New York courts leave unimpaired the
authority of the legislature to create regional agencies of government,
provided they are not delegated any general legislative power. A major
element of difficulty which is widely prevalent, however, may be found
in the various limitations upon financial powers that may be delegated
to a unit of metropolitan government under the various state constitu-
tions. These questions of finance are separately considered at a later
point.
HOME RULE AND METROPOLITAN RULE: A CONFLICT?
Does the principle of home rule conflict with the principle of
metropolitan rule? This question cannot be answered without looking
to the origins of the principle of home rule. The concept goes hand-in-
hand with the requirement of general laws. Both represent a reaction
against legislative interference in municipal affairs. The principle of
general legislation, the more venerable notion, was intended to prevent
a legislature from discriminating between two municipalities of the
same classification " but added nothing to the powers of the municipal-
ity. Home rule was meant to supply the municipalities with the power
to establish and amend their own charters within constitutional limita-
tions, and to legislate on local matters. The gap allegedly left by the
prohibition of special laws was filled by the home rule concept. It
invoked the notion of local action for local problems as opposed to
state action for state problems. When problems expanded significantly
beyond the boundaries of a municipality, however, the principle of home
8. People ex rel Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857).
9. Heister v. Metropolitan Bd. of Health, 37 N.Y. 661 (1868).
10. People ex rel. Hon Yost v. Becker, 203 N.Y. 201, 96 N.E. 381 (1911).
11. The common state constitutional requirement that the legislature act by
general laws in relation to local government permits differential treatment by
classification on a basis which is generous to the legislative purpose. See Commis-
sion on Public Local and Private Legislation, Report, Popular Government, Feb.-
Mar. 1949.
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rule was not meant to apply. This has been recognized from the outset
of the movement in Missouri in 1875 to the present day.-2
Taking "metropolitan" in its current usage, i.e., a central city and
its environs, it is seen that its problems could hardly be contained within
one of the conventional units of municipal government. If the home
rule concept is applied to a metropolitan area it must become metro-
politan home rule. Within the present legal framework, this is possible
through a single avenue: the creation of a general purpose metropolitan
government which would acquire its own home rule entitlement. To
drive the argument full circle, home rule for a single municipality in
a metropolitan area may result in the negation of the home rule
principle for the entire area. As was said in the recent report of the
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Self determination in
one isolated local unit of a large community restricts the opportunity for
genuine home rule in the whole community." 13 It is this interrelation-
ship which converts the matter to a state affair, free of the usual home
rule restrictions on states action. 4
POPULAR CONSENT
The existant legal requirements for voter consent is related to
home rule, but is a distinct matter. The fact that the principle of
metropolitan rule is consistent with the principle of home rule does
not bypass the statutory requirements for the consent of local munic-
ipalities to many metropolitan plans. This may take the form of a
veto in the hands of the governing bodies, or the necessity for a
majority vote of the electorates in every individual municipality covered
by the proposed metropolitan government.'
It is possible in certain states, therefore, for a majority of the
voters in a single municipality to defeat a proposal for a metropolitan
authority favored by an absolute majority of the voters in the entire
area. Authorities requiring such majorities usually fall within the
12. See City of Dearborn v. Michigan Turnpike Authority, 344 Mich. 37,
73 N.W.2d 544 (1955) (state highway construction through a city); Robertson
v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935) (Buffalo Sewer Authority up-
held); McGoLDRicK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930, at
299 (1933).
13. U.S. CoMMISsION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT 44-55 (1955).
14. See citations at note 12 supra; COMMITTEE ON STATE-LocAL RELATIONS OF
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE-LocAL RELATIONS 172 (1946).
Compare MoTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICAN CITIES (1949), with FORDHAM, MODEL
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953).
15. The notion of a popular referendum in these matters is widespread and
stems from the voluntary origin of local governments, although not a requirement
of common law. Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N.H. 266 (1856); see, e.g., Faust, Voters
Turn Thumbs Down on Pittsburgh's Metropolitan Charter, 18 NAT'L MUNIC.
REv. 529 (1929).
1957]
594 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
first classification mentioned above calling for a radical displacement of
boundary lines and office holders. Annexation, city-county consolida-
tion and federation fit into this category. In many states, a con-
stitutional amendment and legislative authorization or both must
precede the vote in the affected municipalities.
The dual requirement of express prior legislative authorization and
concurrent popular majorities has made the use of the devices of
consolidation and federation extremely difficult, or politically impos-
sible."8 City-county consolidation was effected in this century only in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where but two majorities-in the city and in
the remaining area considered as a whole-were required. Large
scale annexations, infrequent in recent years, are implemented where
the vote of the electorate in the area to be annexed is not controlling.
In Virginia, which has a successful record of recent annexations, deter-
mination of the "necessity and expediency" of annexation is completely
in the hands of a special annexation court. This procedure has been
upheld by the appellate courts in Virginia and works smoothly there.1 7
The question of the constitutionality of this delegation of legislative
power to the judiciary was raised in a recent study.' 8 Of greater sig-
nificance is a 1953 decision of the Iowa Supreme Court: a statute
conferring on the courts a power similar to that in the Virginia grant-
to determine when annexations are "necessary" and "desirable"-was
held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.' 9 On
principle, the values in consolidation or annexation are political, not
legal, and any effort to enshroud them in judicial forms cannot alter
their character.
The obstacles to effective re-adjustment of the areas of political
subdivision have underscored the importance of less radical means of
integrating authority. These include the Toronto plan of federation,
co-operative formation of ad hoc service districts, re-allocation of service
responsibilities by legislative mandate, and intermunicipal contracts for
the rendering of governmental services by the more able unit. While
the basic problem in these arrangements is financial-that is, in public
16. It should not be inferred from this that the many legal requirements
for local majorities have, in practice, been the major stumbling block for consoli-
dation proposals. Out of almost a score of rejected consolidation proposals in this
century, only five got to the stage of a local vote and rejection. The others were
refused either legislative authorization or a constitutional amendment by the entire
state electorate. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND THE METRO-
POLITAN PROBLEm 71-74 (1956).
17. Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941).
18. FRYER, ANALYSIS OF ANNEXATION IN MICHIGAN TOGETHER WITH A COM-
PARISON OF ANNEXATION IN OTHER STATES 47 (1951).
19. State ex rel. Klise v. Town of Riverdale, 244 Iowa 423, 57 N.W.2d 63
(1953).
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borrowing and taxation which are separately considered below-a
variety of special state constitutional problems beset the architect of
the order in this field.
The formation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 20 is
a unique illustration of the simplicity of common-law background. The
motivation for this effort was an urgent need for schools, water supply
and rapid transit facilities throughout the region of the City of Toronto
and twelve adjoining municipalities. The history and development
of the municipality is ably set forth in a separate paper in this sym-
posium."' While the constituent municipalities remain as independent
governmental entities, the metropolitan government is vested with
responsibility for schools, sewerage disposal, water supply, major roads,
transportation, regional parks and certain social welfare services. It
is contemplated that a metropolitan police force and metropolitan fire
force will be added before long.
Two essential powers of the metropolitan government are delegated
to the metropolitan council, that is, the power to assess unified area-
wide taxes and the power to control land use planning throughout the
district. The administration of transportation functions is delegated
to a separate commission known as the Toronto Transit Commission.
appointed by the Metropolitan Council but functioning independently
thereof except that the credit of the metropolitan corporation is used to
support transit operations. For school purposes, a separate metropolitan
school board was also established by the act, consisting of the respective
chairmen of the boards of education of the constituent municipalities.
The credit and taxing power of the metropolitan corporation is also
made available to the school board. Despite these major responsibilities
and far-reaching powers, affecting 1,300,000 persons residing in thirteen
municipalities comprising 240 square miles, the legislation was enacted
without any popular referendum, and has produced remarkably little
litigation.2"
Among the American states, by contrast, a variety of constitutional
provisions reflecting the fears of bygone days, together with a pervasive
reliance upon the popular referendum as an assurance of merit to the
most technical proposals, have presented some real obstacles to
effective co-operation. One of these is the maxim that a city may not
be a giver of gifts. It was this maxim that presented substantial
difficulty, even though it was overcome, to one of our state courts in
20. 2 ELIz. 2, c. 73 (Canada 1953).
21. See Milner, The Metropolitan Toronto Plai, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 570 (1957).
22. One of the few cases involved the question of jurisdiction, municipal or
metropolitan, over fluidation of the public potable water supply. Village of Forest
Hill v. Metropolitan Toronto, [1955] Ont. 889.
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dealing with a co-operative airport venture undertaken by a county and
two cities within the county. Appropriate state legislation created an
airport authority with a governing body consisting of five members, one
each to be appointed by the city council in each of the two cities, and
three to be appointed by the county commissioners. It was contended,
with the support of a vigorous minority of the court, that the legislature
could not authorize two cities to contribute to the airport authority for
the reason that such a contribution would not be for a public purpose of
the respective cities. While this arrangement was upheld, the court's
opinion intimates that a different result might have prevailed had the
record shown that there was any lending of municipal credit or pledge
of the municipal taxing power in violation of the state constitution.23
In the less conservative cases, however, our courts have upheld exten-
sive arrangements for intermunicipal cooperation. For example, a
municipal housing authority has been granted a writ of mandamus to
compel a city to perform a cooperation contract which contained an
undertaking by the city to vacate certain streets and to zone and re-zone
a certain area in connection with a public housing project.24
DELEGATION OF POWERS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING
The two main tools of metropolitan integration-recognized in the
Toronto federation plan-the central power to plan for services and
improvements, and the central power to integrate the public credit of
the area, may present legal doubts in some states depending upon the
form of administrative organization of the metropolitan government.
By its nature as an integrating agency, the governing body of a metro-
politan government is not particularly well suited to popular election.
Thus it is that the boards and commissions at the head of the largest
public authorities are appointive, and the council of the metropolitan
government of Toronto was made to consist of ex officio representatives
from the constituent municipalities.
Where the governing body is not directly elected by the people,
and the power of taxation is conferred upon the metropolitan govern-
ment, the plan may encounter the old slogan of "no taxation without
-representation" which has become fixed as a rule of law in most
jurisdictions. This was the problem created by an old New Jersey
23. Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1946) ; cf. Board
of Education v. City of Corbin, 301 Ky. 686, 192 S.W.2d 951 (1946) (constitu-
tional provision forbidding appropriation of money by a municipality to any other
corporation, held to deny a city the power to appropriate to an independent co-
terminous school district for the supplementation of teachers' salaries.)
24. State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. City of Great Falls, 110
Mont. 318, 100 P.2d 915 (1940), 50 YALE L.J. 525 (1941).
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statute establishing a regional sewerage district. Under that statute,
the governing body of the district was appointed by the Governor, and
delegated discretion to determine the amount required to be raised by
taxation upon all persons and property within an area which extended
beyond the service area of the district. The act was held unconstitu-
tional on two grounds; first that the district could not be vested with
power to tax persons and property beyond its own limits, and second
that the taxing power could not be delegated to non-elective representa-
tives.' The scope of the doctrine and the authorities has been reviewed
in comprehensive opinions rendered in Pennsylvania 26 and Illinois."
In a subsequent opinion upholding the constitutionality of a regional
airport authority act, which in effect authorized the creation of a
special purpose municipal corporation and included the delegation of
power to levy taxes, the Illinois court reasoned from the parliamentary
power of the legislature over local government that there was no con-
stitutional infirmity in the act creating "a municipal corporation with
power to operate an agency of public safety or welfare, and to tax
for it. . ,, 28
From these cases, it is clear that the power of taxation may not
be delegated to an administrative agency in the more common sense of
the term. While some states will permit the delegation of such power
to appointive officers provided that the creation and organization of
the regional agency is authorized by popular vote, other states will limit
the power to levy taxes to popularly elected governing bodies. Whatever
the legal refinements may be in a given state, it is more likely that the
decision will turn on the political acceptability of the form and extent
of taxing power to be delegated."9
A metropolitan unit which confines itself to the planning, con-
struction and administration of revenue producing enterprises which
are self-liquidating in character, may avoid the problems and implica-
tions of a delegation of the taxing power. The best example of this
characteristic may be found in the Port of New York Authority, a
25. Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs, 71 N.J.L. 574 (1905).
26. Wilson v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 Atl. 90 (1937).
27. People ex rel. Greening v. Bartholf, 388 Il1. 445, 58 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
28. People ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 391 Ill. 237, 62 N.E.2d 809 (1945), citing
Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
29. See DEEM, THE PROBLEM OF BOSTON'S METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
42-60 (Harvard University Bureau of Research in Municipal Government No. 20,
1953); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, URBAN LAND USE AND PROPERTY TAXATION
(Technical Bulletin No. 18, 1952); Round Table: Taxes and User Charges inr
Government Finance, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1955 PROCEEDINGS 139-93
(1956) ; Tobin, Transportation in the New York Metropolitan Region During
the Next Twenty-five Years, in Mr~nopoLIs IN THE MAKING 27 (Regional Plan
Association 1955).
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bi-state agency of the states of New York and New Jersey which has
no power to tax and therefore carefully follows the policy of undertaking
no facility or service which cannot ultimately be made self-sustaining. 0
This element of self-sufficiency has been a dominant characteristic of
public authority development in America, with such notable exceptions
as the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and the
Buffalo Sewer Authority, the former being vested with the power to
levy property taxes and the latter having the power to impose sewer
rentals which have the lien and effect of taxes on a property owner.
As metropolitan units undertake to perform non-revenue producing
services, such as fire and police services, public schools or services which
have not demonstrated a self-liquidating character, such as rapid transit
by rail, the legal problems of organizing metropolitan taxing power
to support such services become more pressing. For those metro-
politan regional units that cannot have direct taxing power for one
reason or another, access to the taxing power of their constituent
municipalities might possibly be afforded through the authority to
certify the operating need of the metropolitan unit to the constituent
municipality with provision that the amount so certified shall be a
mandatory charge-upon the budget of the constituent municipality.3
The delegation of power to incur debt is dependent upon the self-
liquidating character of the operations of a metropolitan unit. If
revenue financing is possible, both the limitations on the delegation of
taxing power and those of constitutional and statutory debt limitations
are avoided. 2 If the power of taxation is delegated, the effect of state
constitutional tax and debt limitations would depend upon whether
they are stated in broad enough terms to encompass the use of public
credit by an unconventional unit of government.3
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN AREAS
Interstate metropolitan areas present the special problem of recon-
ciling two different systems of public law," as well as the potential
30. BIRD, A STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY passim (1949).
31. McAneny v. Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 232 N.Y. 377, 134
N.E. 187 (the power of the transit commission in New York City to require the
levy of taxes was upheld on the theory of the state's plenary power over taxation
and municipal corporations). Contra, State v. Mayor, 103 Iowa 76, 72 N.W. 639
(1897).
32. See Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Consti-
tutional Debt Limitations, 37 CoLUm. L. REv. 177 (1937).
33. Department of Water & Power v. Vroman, 218 Cal. 206, 22 P.2d 698 (1933);
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936);
Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 AUt. 289 (1934). For
an economic justification, see HANSEN & PERLOFF, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES
IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 85 (1944).
34. For example, in the North Jersey-New York metropolitan area, the consti-
tution of New Jersey has no specific provision which might affect the delegation
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advantage of exercising substantive powers derived from the compact
clause of the Federal Constitution. In brief, the question is suggested
whether two states may by compact with the approval of the Congress,
achieve metropolitan governmental purposes through machinery which
would not be available to either of them alone.
The law on the subject is scanty. In recent years the courts have
approved the exercis*e of the police power by the interstate compact
between the states of New Jersey and New York which established the
bi-state Waterfront Commission."
For purposes of analysis, there are two potential grounds upon
which states might rely in order to exercise, by means of a compact,
powers beyond their own constitutional restrictions. These are: (1)
that whenever by the agreement of states and the consent of Congress
an interstate compact comes into operation it has the same effect as a
treaty between sovereign powers; and (2) if a compact becomes a
federal law by reason of congressional consent, the states may proceed
without regard to local constitutional limitations0 6 These may be
somewhat mutually distinguishable reasons.
It has been stated that the "compact . . . adapts to our Union
of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent
sovereign nations." 37 In this light the compact clause is viewed as a
reiteration of the power of sovereign states to enter into agreements,
with the exception, however, that they be consented to by Congress.",
The common view seems to be to conceive of compacts as contracts
between sovereign states, which compacts are superior to subsequent
legislation of either state, and are not unilaterally abrogable but are
of powers to a metropolitan unit of government, whereas the constitution of New
York contains some fifteen separate provisions relating to local taxation and in-
debtedness and public corporations, to be resolved.
35. Staten Island Loaders, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n, 117 F. Supp. 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (upholding compact's prohibition of business of "public loading"
on piers within the port district), aff'd sub nora. Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n,
347 U.S. 439 (1954); Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 116 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of compact prohibition against collection
of union dues if any official of the union has been convicted of a felony).
36. 1 CooLEY, CoNsTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 25 (8th ed. 1927).
37. Hinderlider v. La Plata County, 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938).
38. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838); Poole v.
Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837) ; Marlatt v. Silk, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 1 (1837).
Compacts are then considered as contracts of quasi-international status. Notes,
23 IowA L. R.v. 618, 631 (1938) ; 45 YALE L.J. 324, 328 (1935). Under the doctrine
of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) and United States v. Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. 304 (1936), "inherent" power in states might provide support for treaties
beyond constitutional powers, but it is doubtful if these doctrines, applicable to the
federal government, are equally viable to the states. There are, in fact, several cases
which hold that "states" cannot adopt treaties violative of their own organic law.
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Geoffroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258
(1896).
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subordinate to the Constitution and to judicial review.39 Cases in
respect to the question have been few. The power of one state to
agree with another that the latter shall possess jurisdiction over a
common river, close to the shore of the first state, has been sustained.'
A compact between New Mexico and Colorado provided for "equitable
apportionment" of the waters of the Colorado. The constitutions of
both states incorporated the rule of "prior appropriation." The
Supreme Court denied a claim that the compact was thus invalid,
stating:
"Whether the apportionment of the water of an interstate stream
be made by compact between the upper and lower States with
the consent of Congress or by a decree of this Court, the ap-
portionment is binding upon the citizens of each State and all
water claimants, even where the State had granted the water
rights before it entered into the compact." 41
Here private rights were altered by the terms of a compact, and the
authority of the Colorado legislature to enter into a compact so resulting
was upheld. The efficacy of this decision is questionable, however,
since there was really not a clash between the state constitutions and
the compact. The latter determined the apportionment, as between
states, of the waters of an interstate stream, the former governed the
apportionment within each state of such waters.4
Dyer v. Simss involving a potential clash, avoided the issue by
declaring that no conflict existed. There the West Virginia Supreme
Court had determined that a West Virginia act approving that state's
adherence to the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact was in-
valid, in that (1) the compact was deemed to delegate West Virginia's
police power to other states and to the federal government, and (2) it
was deemed to bind future legislatures to make appropriations for the
continued activities of the Commission and thus to violate the West
Virginia Constitution. Taking the case on certiorari, the Court held
that it had final power to pass upon the meaning and validity of com-
pacts, and to examine determinations of state law by state courts
in the limited field where a compact brings in issue the rights of other
states and the United States. Thus setting the stage, the Court
determined that there was no conflict.
39. See Notes, 23 IowA L. Rav. 573, 578 (1938) ; 45 YALE L.J. 324, 329 (1935).
This is particularly true under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
40. People v. Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455 (1870).
41. Hinderlider v. La Plata County, 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938).
42. See ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINcE 1925, at 95-96
(1951).
43. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Of interest, however, is the concurring opinion of Justice Reed.44
Asserting that under the compact clause federal questions are present for
determination by the court, he stated that the interpretation of the
meaning of a compact controls over a state's application of its own law
through the supremacy clause, and not by any implied federal power
to construe state law. Resting on the second of the grounds initially
stated herein, Justice Reed gave federal scope to compacts and stated,
"Since the Constitution provided the compact for adjusting interstate
relations, compacts may be enforced despite otherwise valid state re-
strictions on state action." ' He rested his conclusion on Hinder-
lider v. La Plata County, 6 although that decision was premised more
on the "sovereign-treaty" concept.
Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion 47 stressed the "sovereign-
treaty" aspect and concluded that West Virginia was estopped from
subsequently denying her power to enter into the compact.
The "federal acts" aspect is another approach. The Supreme
Court has held that compacts, consented to by Congress, are laws of
the Union.48  Although this has been doubted, except perhaps for
purposes of federal jurisdiction,49 this theory was apparently approved
by justice Reed in Dyer v. Sims, and thus credence is lent to the concept
that local constitutional limitations need not restrict states in adopting
federally approved compacts."9
Under either theory, therefore, it is possible to argue that states
are not bound by local constitutional restrictions when executing com-
pacts. As yet the cases do not go quite that far.
CONCLUSION
This limited review of the authorities may well justify the con-
clusion it is not the law that has lagged, but rather the political art
which has been unequal to the task of overcoming the inertia of the
metropolitan mass of the body politic. The well established device of
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 34.
46. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
47. 341 U.S. at 35.
48. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519 (1906); Wedding v. Meyer, 192
U.S. 573, 582 (1904); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421, 430 (1855); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566 (1851).
49. See Notes, 23 IowA L. REv. 618, 627 (1938) ; 45 YALE L.J. 324, 328 (1935);
Comment, 37 MICE. L. REv. 129, 130 (1938).
50. See 34 CoLuM. L. REv. 169 (1934).
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the public authority for self-liquidating projects, the metropolitan
district for tax-supported functions, and various combinations of these
for revenue-producing projects requiring tax subsidy are within legal
reach if they can achieve political acceptability. The choice of specific
applications under the defined conditions of a given metropolitan region
or project cannot be easy, but this is not so much because of a law which
lags as it is because of the practical need to find the solution which
is "constitutionally sound, financially practicable and politically
feasible." "'
51. This is a specification in the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Port of New York Authority and the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, re-
garding the North Jersey-New York rapid transit survey. See METROPOLITAN RAPID
TRANSIT COMMISSION, INTERIM REPORT app. C, at 43 (1955).
